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Re recently, there has been a new focus
of debate among many economists and
policymakers, centered around the rela-
tionship between monetary and fiscal
policy. The debate concerns two ques-
tions: what does fiscal policy imply
about the conduct of monetary policy,
and what does monetary policy imply
about the conduct of fiscal policy?
Many learned economics at a time
when the answer to this question could
be found in the textbook Keynesian de-
mand-management paradigm. Central
to this paradigm was a belief in the abil-
ity of policymakers to fine-tune eco-
nomic activity through judicious
choices from a complementary mix of
fiscal and monetary policy instruments.
The notion that higher levels of real
economic activity could be bought
with higher inflation was part and par-
cel of this view of the world. As long
as this idea prevailed, it was reasonable
to presume that inflation was an inevita-
ble, and acceptable, price to pay for
sustained economic growth.
The high unemployment and inflation
of the 1970s effectively destroyed this
idea of a stable trade-off between infla-
tion and unemployment. The misfor-
tunes of that decade also led to growing
skepticism about the ability of discre-
tionary changes in fiscal or monetary
policy to smooth the short-run cyclical
fluctuations in business activity. An im-
pressive number of economists and
policymakers now accept the idea that
the goal of both fiscal and monetary pol-
icies is to maximize long-run economic
growth, and that price stability, in partic-
ular, is the only contribution that mone-
tary policy can make to this objective.
Despite this progress, there is concern
because, too often, policy discussions
that accept the goal of price stability
proceed to question its attainability, re-
tarding public acceptance. A common
fear is the threat of recession that is fre-
quently associated with the pursuit of
price stability. Recently, I have argued
that threats of recession should not in-
terfere with the long-run goal of price
stability, because price stability actu-
ally reduces the risk of recession and is
a pro-growth policy.
Yet another popular argument raised
against the goal of price stability states
that we should not seek price stability
until we have our fiscal house in order.
Those who hold this view claim that
we cannot commit to a policy of price
stability because large deficits cause
high interest rates, thereby limiting
monetary policy's ability to reduce in-
flation under conditions reasonably
consistent with full employment.
Must the pursuit of sound monetary
policy await further progress toward
more desirable fiscal policies? Argu-
ments that monetary policy must off-
set the economic effects of fiscal
policy choices may be based on false
premises.
ISSN 0428-1276My message is a simple one. Federal
budget deficits should not be allowed
to compromise either the Federal
Reserve's goal of price stability or the
adoption of a specific timetable to
achieve it. Quite the contrary: poor mon-
etary policy, which here will be equated
with the failure to pursue a goal of price
stability, interferes with the pursuit of a
sensible long-term fiscal policy. This is
not to suggest or imply that current fis-
cal policy is ideal, appropriate, or the re-
sult of bad monetary policy. I believe
that savings are too low, at least partly
because of budget deficits, and that mea-
sures to address our savings shortfall
probably must include measures to re-
duce the deficit. However, while we
strive for better fiscal policy, we should
recognize that monetary policy cannot
offset the harm caused by fiscal deficits;
indeed, it can only add to those costs.
• The Elements of Sound Policy
Even policymakers who disagree on de-
tails recognize that sound policies must
have clear objectives, verifiable out-
comes, and rules that are consistently
adhered to. Above all, predictable, veri-
fiable policies ensure that individual
economic decisions are made with a
minimum of uncertainty about policy
objectives and outcomes. If this require-
ment is satisfied, long-term planning
and resource allocation decisions will
not be foiled by policy decisions that
deviate from the expectations of reason-
ably informed citizens. Sound policy
thus requires a resolute focus on the
long term and resistance to policies
that, while expedient in the short run,
introduce even more uncertainty into
an already unpredictable world.
What this means for monetary policy is
clear. We have learned through disap-
pointing experience that monetary pol-
icy cannot be used to manipulate real
variables for any reasonable period of
time. We have also learned that, in the
long run, inflation is the one economic
variable for which monetary policy is
unambiguously responsible. Because
inflation is a monetary phenomenon, in-
flation must always be the primary con-
cern of those who set monetary policy.
My support for long-run zero inflation,
or, equivalently, a price-level target, is a
matter of record. Inflation can ultimately
contribute to recession and has debilitat-
ing effects on economic performance.
Equally important, a zero inflation pol-
icy satisfies the key requirements of
sound policy: it is clear, it is verifiable,
and it has consistent rules. Unlike other
inflation rates, zero inflation is a policy
goal that has the potential to be unambig-
uously understood by everyone.
In a similar fashion, a sound fiscal pol-
icy is one that clearly sets priorities and
maps out a multiyear commitment for
taxes and spending. The budget allo-
cates resources between the public and
private sectors and among competing
claims within the public sector. These
budget considerations are based upon a
political and social consensus about
public expenditure priorities and the
proper division of functions between
the private and public sectors. It is im-
portant that the financing of such objec-
tives is communicated clearly, within
long-term budget constraints, and with
a tax strucure that enables citizens to
plan accordingly.
If we can agree that my description of
sound monetary and fiscal policy is ap-
propriate, how do we get from here to
there? The road appears to be cluttered
with many obstacles. For example, skep-
tics ask, can policymakers pursue a zero
inflation policy in the current fiscal en-
vironment without incurring unaccept-
able economic costs? And, how should
monetary authorities respond to the sup-
posed inability of fiscal policymakers to
fashion sound policy decisions? These
are familiar questions and doubts that
are frequently raised to thwart the pur-
suit of sound monetary policy.
• Is Zero Inflation Too Costly
To Pursue?
Does current fiscal policy make price
stability too costly to pursue? Many
argue that the answer is yes: large fed-
eral budget deficits cause high interest
rates, forcing the Fed to ease monetary
policy in order to keep interest rates at
levels consistent with full employment.
This argument is weak for two reasons.
First, both the federal budget deficit
and, more important, the growth rate of
federal government spending, at least
measured relative to the economy, have
been falling for the past several years
and should continue to do so. Second,
even if fiscal policy choices were to put
upward pressure on interest rates, it is
far from clear that the Fed can do any-
thing to alleviate this pressure.
• The Declining Size of Government
Despite some general reservations
about the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit reduction legislation, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the pro-
cess has exerted at least a moderating
influence on the growth of the federal
government. In the two years preced-
ing passage of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings bill, the deficit aver-
aged close to 5 percent of GNP; as of
the end of fiscal year 1989, that num-
ber had fallen to under 3 percent.
An often-heard objection to the deficit
statistic involves the claim, made with
some justification, that a good deal of
the progress in deficit reduction has
been accomplished by strange account-
ing devices and various forms of budgetchicanery. Certainly there is some
ground for those claims. But, after all,
the reported deficit is itself based on
somewhat arbitrary accounting conven-
tions. Should contributions to the social
security trust fund be regarded as tax
collections or as loans from the working
population? Should borrowing to fi-
nance public infrastructure be offset on
the government books by the capital ac-
quired with the borrowed funds? These
are issues on which honest people can
agree to disagree.
Many would argue that more important
than the deficit question is the question
of how much of the income generated
by the U.S. economy is appropriated
by the federal government and how
that percentage has changed. In these
terms the answer is unambiguous: net
federal outlays, which rose to about 24
percent of GNP in the mid-1980s, have
fallen every year since passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation,
to about 20 percent in 1989.
Although important issues concerning
the macroeconomic effects of transfer
policies, tax structures, and the compo-
sition of government expenditures re-
main unresolved, it can be safely said
that progress is being made toward alle-
viating concerns that are typically asso-
ciated with deficit expenditure. While
not ideal, the fiscal policy environment
has become more conducive to the pur-
suit of price stability.
There is, of course, legitimate concern
that the progress in deficit and expendi-
ture reduction might cease or even be
reversed, for any number of reasons.
How should such a reversal influence
monetary policy? I return to an issue I
raised earlier: even if fiscal policy
choices were to put upward pressure on
interest rates, and there is little consen-
sus among economists that this is the
case, it is far from clear that the Fed
can do anything to ease that pressure.
It is important to emphasize the distinc-
tion between real and nominal inter-
est rates. Real rates of return are based
on the productivity of labor, capital,
and other real assets in a society. In an
inflationary environment, nominal
rates of return include an inflation pre-
mium to compensate lenders for being
repaid in money with reduced purchas-
ing power. Ultimately, it is real interest
rates that affect the consumption and
production decisions of individuals and
businesses and the allocation of re-
sources over time.
Our economic experience since World
War II fails to reveal a firm relationship
between real interest rates and the
growth rate of the monetary base, or
the various other monetary aggregates
that the Fed can control.
Again, it is important to focus on real in-
terest rates. The correlation between
monetary policy and nominal interest
rates that dominates discussion in the fi-
nancial press tells us next to nothing
about the relationship between mone-
tary growth and the real interest rates
that govern the allocation of resources
over time. Every movement in the fed-
eral funds rate does not produce equiva-
lent changes in real interest rates, in the
productivity of our capital stock, or in
any of the other important real variables
affecting economic activity. The fact
that monetary policy exerts relatively di-
rect control over the federal funds rate
does not imply that real interest rates
can, similarly, be controlled by mone-
tary policy.
It is worth digressing for a moment to
consider a relatively new issue that is
making its way into fiscal policy discus-
sions, and is leading some people to
argue that a zero-inflation monetary pol-
icy would be hazardous. This issue is
the so-called "peace dividend." The con-
cern is that the thawing of tensions be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union will result in budget savings and
lower government outlays, especially in
the military area, which will reduce ag-
gregate demand and force the Fed to
ease in an effort to maintain full employ-
ment in the economy.
I will ignore the obvious irony that both
contractionary fiscal policy, in the form
of lower government expenditures, and
expansionary fiscal policy, as implied
in the previous example by the conten-
tion that deficits are excessively large,
are being separately invoked to justify
expansionary monetary policy. I will
instead simply reemphasize the points
already made.
The first of those points is that govern-
ment expenditures have been falling as
a share of total output for several years.
As noted earlier, net federal outlays as
a share of GNP have fallen by more
than three-and-a-half percentage points
since 1986—a period during which eco-
nomic growth has continued.
The second point is that the ability of
the Fed to consistently and predictably
control real variables is tenuous at best.
Just as it is inappropriate to infer that
monetary policy can change real inter-
est rates, it is inappropriate to conclude
that higher growth rates of money
increase the overall level of economic
activity.The fallacy of automatically drawing
this conclusion is nicely illustrated in a
recent Economic Commentary pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland's research staff. It is a well-
known fact that each December both
the money supply and real activity
swell. Is the increase in the money sup-
ply responsible for the increase in eco-
nomic activity? Does the Fed cause
Christmas? Certainly not. The annual
fourth-quarter increase in the money
supply is the Fed's response to eco-
nomic activity, not a cause of it.
If it were really in our power to consis-
tently increase output by the mere cre-
ation of money, why not increase the
money supply without bound, creating
infinite wealth? The answer to this pat-
ently absurd question is obvious to ev-
eryone. To create money without bound
would result in infinite inflation, not in-
finite wealth. But if a lot of new money
will not deliver the goods, why do we
think a little will? The very suggestion
that we can reliably control real activity
with monetary policy, the old Keynes-
ian demand-management notion, sug-
gests that we have yet to fully assimi-
late the lessons that recent economic
history should have taught us.
• Is Sound Monetary Policy a
Necessary Condition for Sound
Fiscal Budget Policy?
I have argued that fiscal policy is not
currently a serious impediment to the
pursuit of price stability. While we
each may have our own view about
what appropriate fiscal policy is, it
does seem to be moving in the appro-
priate direction. I am also highly skepti-
cal that monetary authorities have the
power or wisdom to undo poor fiscal
policy choices.
Having claimed that sound fiscal pol-
icy is not a necessary condition for
sound monetary policy, let me now
shift the focus somewhat and pose the
following question: Is sound monetary
policy a necessary condition for sound
fiscal policy?
Recall my definition of sound fiscal
policy. Sound fiscal policy clearly sets
priorities and maps out multi-year com-
mitments for taxes and spending.
Sound fiscal policy allocates resources
between the public and private sectors
and within the public sector on the
basis of political and social consensus.
And sound fiscal policy communicates
each of these objectives clearly, within
long-term budget constraints, so that
private decision-making is consistent
with efficient resource allocation.
The important question thus becomes,
does the absence of a zero-inflation
monetary policy interfere with the at-
tainment of sound fiscal policy or,
more generally, is a zero-inflation mon-
etary policy conducive to the attain-
ment of sound fiscal policy?
I have emphasized the necessity of for-
mulating fiscal policy on the basis of ob-
jectives that are defined in the context of
a long-term budget constraint. In order
to realize this goal, fiscal policymakers,
like decision-makers in business, require
an environment in which the constraints
and conditions are as predictable as pos-
sible. Such predictability is impossible
when monetary policy results in vari-
able and unpredictable inflation. By
changing the real value of government
debt, unforeseen changes in the rate of
inflation redistribute wealth between the
private and public sectors and alter the
long-term budget condition of the gov-
ernment. In response, fiscal policy-
makers must either continually revise
their long-term planning assumptions or
accept deviations from the originally
planned allocation of resources between
the private and public sectors.
Without an explicit policy rule that ef-
fectively precludes the financing of mar-
ginal expenditures through the inflation
tax, fiscal and monetary authorities can
become locked into what economist
Thomas Sargent has described as a
game of "policy chicken." A cynic
might say that no Congressman worth
his or her franking privilege would ever
choose to take the heat from imposing
budgetary discipline when there re-
mains hope of an accommodating Fed.
A more benevolent observer would note
that the possibility of seeing the pains-
taking process of formulating long-term
goals undone by the unforeseeable con-
sequences of high and volatile inflation
cannot fail to make an already difficult
task infinitely more difficult and cer-
tainly cannot contribute to Congres-
sional enthusiasm for making the tough
long-term fiscal decisions.
• Inflation Can Undermine the Tax
Structure
Many people have recognized the prob-
lems posed by variable and unpredict-
able inflation, but have argued that mod-
erate inflation is of no concern as long
as the rate is stable. I happen to believe
that "stable inflation" is an oxymoron.
But even if it isn't, the complications
that inflation poses for the tax structure
provide additional insight into why zero
is the magic inflation rate.The indexing provisions that have re-
cently become part of the personal tax
code are an explicit recognition of the
fact that even stable rates of inflation
can distort marginal tax rates, redirect
economic activity in arbitrary ways,
and interfere with the efficient alloca-
tion of resources. Despite some prog-
ress, however, the tax structure is any-
thing but fully insulated from the
effects of inflation. Capital gains, inter-
est income earned by households, and
depreciation allowances in the business
sector are but a few of the examples
often cited as areas in which tax rules
are still distorted by inflation.
We could, of course, attempt to index
all forms of income and expense aris-
ing from economic activity. But any
such attempt would make the tax code
even more complicated than it already
is. Because of the difficulty associated
with complete indexation, pressures for
discrete changes in the tax code will in-
evitably build. The effort to restore spe-
cial treatment for capital gains is a
good example, which also illustrates
that attempts to adjust the tax code may
undermine the progress we have made
in developing a tax system that is con-
sistent with my definition of sound fis-
cal policy. There is one solution: make
the issue moot by pursuing a monetary
policy that sustains an average rate of
inflation equal to zero.
• Conclusion
Sound economic policy, be it fiscal or
monetary, must, at a minimum, be pre-
dictable. In the absence of predictabil-
ity, the efficient functioning of the econ-
omy, and hence long-run prospects for
economic growth, will be severely in-
hibited. For monetary policy, I believe
that predictability translates into the ag-
gressive pursuit of price stability.
The pursuit of sound monetary policy
need not await further progress toward
the establishment of desirable fiscal
policies. The argument that monetary
policy can offset the economic effects
of fiscal policy choices is based on the
idea that monetary policy can consis-
tently and predictably control real inter-
est rates and real economic activity.
This idea is tenuous both theoretically
and empirically. Furthermore, the prog-
ress that has been made on the deficit
and government expenditure front sug-
gests that conditions are indeed more
favorable for the pursuit of a zero-infla-
tion monetary policy.
Not only is it unnecessary for sound
monetary policy choices to await sound
fiscal policy choices, it is imperative
that we adopt sound monetary policy
first. Sound fiscal policy decisions, like
sound private economic decisions, re-
quire the stable inflation environment
that only the Fed can provide. In addi-
tion, the tax-related distortions and eco-
nomic complexities associated with
even stable positive rates of inflation
argue strongly for a zero inflation goal.
What both monetary and fiscal policy
must accomplish is the creation of an
economic environment in which the
rules of the game are well understood
and designed to minimize interference
with the realization of society's broader
goals. Precisely because of its indepen-
dence, the Fed has the unique ability to
implement a policy regime that works
toward these goals. Indeed, without a
clear and committed price stability pol-
icy by the Fed, the probability of sus-
taining a clear and committed fiscal
policy is reduced.
W. Lee Hoskins is president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The material in
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